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ABSTRACT
This research compares results from laboratory experiments with predictions from theory for
decisions made by competing suppliers. We consider a supply chain in which a single buyer
outsources the manufacture of a commodity product to suppliers not on the basis of price, but
rather on service. Three different criteria on which suppliers compete are evaluated: 1) a
guaranteed specific inventory fill-rate, 2) guaranteed level of base-stock, and 3) a parameter
optimizing the supply chain in the buyer’s favor. Our results show that in most cases, suppliers’
decisions are significantly different than the Nash equilibrium, meaning that they do not
maximize profit. We examine loss aversion as an influence that might offer an explanation for
this behavior

KEYWORDS: Behavioral Operations Management, Service Operations; Supply Chain Contracts
and Incentives, Outsourcing, Cognition and Reasoning, Laboratory experiments
INTRODUCTION
The importance of outsourcing is widely accepted both in academia and by practitioners.
Outsourcing, among other benefits, lets companies focus on their core competencies and be
more flexible in an increasingly competitive and volatile business world. What is still debatable
among the experts is how outsourcing can be done most effectively. The traditional approach is
to negotiate the contract terms with the suppliers. Some buyers then add incentives such as
revenue sharing, or monetary rewards and penalties, based on the quality of service they
receive. Another approach, which can reduce negotiation efforts, is to let suppliers compete for
the buyer’s business. Many researchers have studied these forms of outsourcing configurations.
However, although widely studied, existing models and theoretical results have rarely been
subjected to empirical verification, and to our knowledge has never been done for the
outsourcing model we consider.
In this research, we use laboratory experiments to investigate whether decisions made by
subjects playing the role of competing suppliers will match theoretical predictions. The
theoretical basis on which this comparison is based from work by Elahi (2013), who provides
results for different types of competition for outsourcing setups. The model from that study
utilized a stylized queuing model to analyze decisions of make-to-stock suppliers competing for
demand share from a buyer using several different performance measures (criteria) to allocate
demand. Our study is based on a similar model, and we also evaluate different criteria for
demand allocation.
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We consider cases with three different criteria used by the buyer to allocate demand. In the first,
the buyer allocates demand to each supplier proportionally a service level, as measured by
inventory fill rate, the supplier guarantees with respect to other suppliers. We term this type of
competition a service competition. Each supplier can increase the demand share they will
receive by providing a higher service level than the competing suppliers. Depending on the
decisions other suppliers make, a supplier offering a higher service level will a larger share of
the buyer’s business, but at the same time also incur higher costs.
In the second criteria the buyer allocates demand proportionally to the base-stock level a
supplier guarantees to maintain on hand. This is termed an inventory competition, and the
dynamics of demand allocation and supplier costs are similar to a service competition. In the
third type of competition, the buyer allocates demand using a parameter designed to intensify
the competition to a level at which each supplier will be induced to offer the highest feasible
level of service, even to the point where the supplier has no profits. Because this criteria
optimizes the supply chain in favor of the buyer, we term this an optimal competition. The
parameter on which an optimal competition is based is a combination of service level, inventory
level, and the suppliers’ cost functions. Although this parameter is more complicated than the
criteria for service or inventory competitions, this type of competition can produce the best
results for the buyer and can have important implications in practice.
Our analysis uses data gathered from experiments to determine whether subjects’ decisions
converge at predicted Nash equilibrium in the three above mentioned types of competition. To
increase the robustness of our study, scenarios in which suppliers have dissimilar cost
structures the experimental design also part of the experimental design.
Our results show that subjects’ decisions do not necessarily converge to the Nash equilibrium.
With two of the three types of competition, service and inventory competitions, subjects’
decisions are usually higher than the Nash equilibrium. Under the third, the optimal competition,
subjects’ decisions are usually lower than the Nash equilibrium. Although, subjects cannot
generally capture the theoretical Nash equilibrium, experimental results show that as theory
predicts, subjects exert more efforts and are closer to the Nash equilibrium under optimal
competition than when in inventory or service competitions. However, in many cases there are
significant differences between suppliers’ decisions and what is predicted by theory.
We also evaluate insights to explain these deviations from the Nash equilibrium and profit
maximization. We show that subjects’ loss aversion can offer an explanation for the optimal
competitions, especially if the competing suppliers have identical cost structures.
Finding that suppliers do not make decisions that maximize profits, and therefore do not behave
rationally from an economic standpoint, has significant practical implications. We are specifically
interested in the cases where suppliers in an optimal competition do not act as theory promises,
because the results have important implications for how buyers should structure their criteria for
outsourcing among suppliers in practice.
In the remainder of this paper we first briefly review related literature before describing the
theoretical development of our supply chain model and the Nash equilibrium that predicts what
the results of our experiments should be. From that we draw our hypotheses, and then present
our experimental design followed by our results. Finally, a discussion of those results leads to
our conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
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While not evaluated empirically, others have modeled outsourcing problems through forms of
service-based competition in studies which have considerable parallels to ours.
Another paper that models outsourcing through effort-based competition is by Cachon and
Zhang (2007). These authors model the competition between two identical make-to-order
suppliers who supply to a single buyer. The buyer allocates the demand to the suppliers based
on their processing rates, and the authors show the impact of different allocation schemes; in
their model, the buyer’s objective is to maximize the service level provided by the suppliers.
They show the form of a linear allocation function that can produce the best results for the
buyer.
Gilbert and Weng (1998) model a principal who allocates demand to two competing agents
(service facilities). The identical agents decide on the cost of their service rates to attract more
demand shares. The principal either allocates the demand to the agents from a single queue or
from separate queues (equal expected waiting times). They show the conditions which one
allocation might be superior to the other one. Ha et al. (2003) model two suppliers who compete
for supply to a customer with deterministic demand. When the identical suppliers compete
based on delivery frequency, the authors (using an EOQ model) show an allocation scheme that
minimizes the customer’s inventory cost. Jin and Ryan (2012) model two identical make-tostock suppliers who compete based on both price and service level (fill rate) for demand shares
of a single buyer. The buyer uses an allocation function in which the allocated demand is
proportional to an exponential function. This allocation function is characterized by a parameter
that shows the relative importance of price versus service level. The authors show the optimal
value of this parameter, which minimizes the buyer’s cost. Their model uses several of the same
assumptions as we do for ours, albeit for a different application than outsourcing.
Benjaafar et al. (2007) compare two competition mechanisms: supplier allocation (SA) and
supplier selection (SS). In a supplier allocation (SA) mechanism, each supplier receives a share
of the buyer’s demand which increases with the service level that supplier provides. In a
supplier selection (SS) mechanism, the buyer selects only one supplier to receive the entire
demand. The probability of a supplier being selected increases by the service level provided.
They show SS can result in higher service levels.
In addition to service level, Benjaafar et al. (2007) introduced another competition parameter.
The authors show a reformulation of their problem in which they choose the demandindependent component of the service cost (which they name supplier’s effort) as the
competition parameter. They show that when the demand is allocated proportional to a power
function of this competition parameter, supplier service level can be maximized. The authors
acknowledge that the service-based and effort-based competitions can lead to different
equilibrium service levels. However, they do not actually compare the two types of competitions.
In other works, Elahi (2007) shows an optimal form of allocation function for a service-based
competition which can result in maximum feasible service level for the buyer. A review of
service-based outsourcing can be found in Zhou and Ren (2010).
Elahi (2013) models an outsourcing problem in which make-to-stock suppliers compete for the
demand share of a single buyer. In that study the author considers competitions in which
suppliers’ competition when the buyer’s demand is allocated proportional to a competition
criterion (competition parameter). Elahi focuses on the impact of the different competition
criteria, and it is from this work that we derive our model of supply chain outsourcing.
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Our experimental results suggest a similar behavior under service and inventory competition.
That is, when the suppliers are heterogeneous, the sum of subjects’ decisions is higher than
what theory predicts. The literature on experimental studies of rent seeking is not limited to what
is mentioned here. A comprehensive review of this literature, however, is beyond the scope of
this paper. A more detailed review of experimental studies on rent-seeking can be found in
Houser and Stratmann (2012).
There have been few studies to empirically validate these models. The only experimental paper
in the supply chain literature to evaluate simultaneous competition between decision makers
that has similarity to ours is by Chen et al. (2012). Their study was of competition between
retailers (buyers) for the limited capacity of a common supplier (seller). It found that the
subjects’ average order is much less than what Nash equilibrium predicts, and they attribute this
behavior to subjects’ bounded rationality (random errors). The Quantal Response Equilibrium is
used to incorporate random errors in subjects’ decisions.
Similarly to Chen et al., we model the simultaneous competition between decision makers and
compare experimental results with the Nash equilibrium. We also explore reasons for these
differences. However, our model considers the competition between suppliers (sellers) for the
limited demand of a buyer. Moreover, our competition criteria is different from those used by
Chen et al., and we find additional influences that may account for the differences between
theory and experimental results.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe our supply chain model and present the theoretical formulation of
the competition setup for our experiments. We also show the Nash equilibrium decisions for
different types of competition we consider in this research. The supply chain setup in this paper
follows the setup presented in Elahi (2013). The proofs of all the results of this section can also
be found in this reference.
We consider the case of a single buyer who is outsourcing the production of a product among N
potential suppliers. Suppliers manufacture this product in a make-to-stock fashion according to
a base-stock inventory policy. Demand from the buyer is generated according to a Poisson
process with rate λ, with the fraction of demand allocated to supplier i denoted by δi, where 0 <
δi < 1 and ∑
= 1.
Accordingly, demand generated by the buyer arrives at each supplier with a rate of δi λ. The
variable δi can be viewed as the probability that ongoing demand is allocated to supplier i; in
aggregate, this translates to the market share awarded to the supplier.
The suppliers’ production times are exponentially distributed with the rate µi , and in response to
demand from the buyer, suppliers adjust their capacity (production rate) to maintain a fixed
target utilization ρi where ρi = δi λ / µi and 0 < ρi < 1 for supplier i. Hence, for each supplier the
production system can be modeled as an M/M/1 queuing system. The assumptions of Poisson
arrival and exponential processing times, in addition to being plausible in many practical cases,
are common practice in this field since they make the derivations mathematically tractable (see
for instance Gilbert and Weng, 1998; Cachon and Zhang, 2007; Benjaafar et al. 2007).
Finished goods at the suppliers are managed according to a base-stock policy with base-stock
level zi (zi >0) at supplier i. This means that the arrival of demand at supplier i always triggers a
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replenishment order with the supplier’s production system. Suppliers incur the inventory holding
cost. That is, each supplier i incurs a holding cost hi per unit of inventory per unit time.
Moreover, each supplier incurs a production cost ci per unit produced, and a capacity cost ki
applied per unit of capacity (measured in terms of the associated production rate). The revenue
for each supplier is based on the demand they are allocated and the price of the product, p per
unit, at which the buyer procures it. We assume that this price is the same across all suppliers.
This can be the case when the buyer is powerful enough to set the price, or when market
mechanisms set the price (the case of a commodity product for instance). This assumption
means the competition is based on criteria other than price.
When a supplier cannot fulfill the buyer’s demand from on-hand inventory, we assume the buyer
will wait until the supplier produces the backordered units. We exclude the possibility of the
buyer switching to another supplier. We also exclude the possibility of the buyer procuring the
product from a supplier outside of the pool of competing suppliers, assuming that the product is
not readily available in the market. The assumption of backordering the demand when it cannot
be satisfied from on-hand inventory is consistent with the assumptions in earlier papers such as
Cachon and Zhang (2007) and Benjaafar et al. (2007). Netessine et al. (2006) also use this
assumption in studying the impact of customers’ backordering behavior on the performance of
competing firms in a market. The assumption of backordering the unfulfilled demand is
particularly essential in our competition model, since switching to another supplier violates the
demand allocation rule, which is (as we will discuss below) the basis of the competition.
Backordered demand is costly for the buyer. It might lead to delayed delivery or incomplete
orders shipped to the buyer’s own customers. Backorders can also negatively affect the buyer’s
production system, which are possibly accentuated if a just-in-time system is used. Therefore,
the buyer measures each supplier’s service level in terms of fill rate, si = Pr(Ii > 0). That is, the
probability that a unit demand allocated to a supplier is not backordered and can be fulfilled
immediately from on-hand inventory (Ii is the inventory level at supplier i). Hence, the buyer’s
objective is to maximize the average service level received from suppliers,

q = ∑i =1δ i si
N

.

Maximizing the average service level is equivalent to minimizing the probability of backorders
from the suppliers, which in turn means lower costs such as from missing schedules for the
buyer.
The product being outsourced is a commodity product; as such the buyer seeks to encourage
suppliers to provide the highest level of service. For this, the buyer specifies a performance
measure on which demand will be allocated to suppliers. The buyer announces this
performance measure as the criteria for demand allocation before the competition starts. The
suppliers then simultaneously commit to a level of the announced performance measure.
As described earlier, we examine three different types of performance measures, a service
competition for which demand is allocated according to guaranteed fill rates, an inventory
competition with demand allocated according to guaranteed base-stock, and an optimal
competition with demand allocated using a measure that combines the measures for both
service and inventory competitions. We next offer the details for each of these performance
measures.

(1)
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In a service competition, each supplier is awarded a demand share proportional to the fill rate
the supplier guarantees. The buyer uses a proportional allocation function α iS ( si , s−i ) which
specifies the fraction of demand allocated to supplier i based on the fill rate si and the fill rates
s−i = (s1 ,..., si −1 , si +1 ,..., sN ) offered by supplier i’s competitors. Stated differently,

δ i = α iS ( si , s−i ) =

si

∑

N
j =1

sj

(2)

In an inventory competition, a supplier’s demand share depends on the base-stock level the
supplier will assure the buyer. In this type of competition, the buyer uses a proportional
allocation function α iI ( zi , z− i ) which specifies the fraction of demand allocated to supplier i
based on that base-stock level zi and the base-stock levels z−i = ( z1 ,..., zi −1 , zi +1 ,..., zN ) offered by
supplier i’s competitors, which means

δ i = α iI ( zi , z− i ) =

zi

∑

.

N

(3)

z
j =1 j

For an optimal competition the buyer’s demand is allocated according to a performance
measure, ξi , that is a combination of fill rate and base-stock level:
N


  N −1
ρi
1 
Nh
.
z
s
−
ξi = 
 i
i 
N  λ ( p − c − k / ρi ) 
1 − ρi  

(4)

Therefore, the demand share allocated to supplier i in an optimal competition will be:

α iO (ξi , ξ − i ) =

ξi

∑

ξ
j =1 j

N

.

(5)

This type of competition can induce the maximum feasible service level for a buyer (suppliers
are bound to provide a positive service level as a participation condition under this type of
competition). The performance measure defined in (4) is more complicated and less intuitive
than direct measures like fill rate or base-stock level. It is, in fact, an abstract measure that can
set the shape of the profit function such that the competition equilibrium point occurs when each
supplier exerts the maximum effort. In other words, this performance measure can intensify the
competition to its maximum level, where each supplier spends all their revenue (and zeroes out
profit) to provide the maximum feasible level of ξi.
Note that in the definition of this performance measure, zi and si are interdependent parameters
(si = 1 - ρzi). It is not very difficult to show that ξi is an increasing function of either si or zi .
Therefore, when a supplier guarantees the maximum feasible level of ξi, it means that it
guarantees the maximum feasible service level for the buyer, as well. Elahi (2013) shows a
general form of the performance measure for optimal competition that has the ability to induce
any predefined set of demand shares at the competition equilibrium. The specific form shown in
(4) induces identical demand shares for all suppliers (δi = 1/N). This is an intuitive selection
when the suppliers are identical. The buyer may also decide to allocate equal demand shares to
heterogeneous suppliers to minimize the risk of relying on a specific supplier
The suppliers’ profit functions for each the service, inventory, and optimal competitions,
respectively are:
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 ln(1 − si )

π iS ( si , s −i ) = α iS ( si , s −i )λ ( p − ci − ki / ρi ) − hi 

 ln ρi

π iO (ξi , ξ −i ) = α iO (ξi , ξ − i )λ ( p − ci − ki / ρi ) −

−


ρi
si  ,
1 − ρi 

λ ( p − c − k / ρi )
N

( N ξi )

N −1
N

π iI ( zi , z −i ) = α iI (

(6)

.

(8)

This formulation of the problem assumes (a) the buyer can enforce the fill rates or base-stock
levels chosen by the suppliers, (b) suppliers’ cost structures are common knowledge (a
complete information setup), and (c) suppliers participate in the competition as long as they can
earn a non-negative expected profit.
These three forms of competition have unique Nash equilibriums. For the case of identical
suppliers, these equilibrium points can be found from:

Service Competition

Inventory Competition

Optimal Competition

λ( p − c − k / ρ)
 N −1 
sS* =  2 
1
ρ 
 N  
h
−

*
 (1 − sS ) ln(1 / ρ ) 1 − ρ 
 N −1  λ( p − c − k / ρ )
z *I =  2 
*
 N   ρ zI +1 1 
ln 
h 1 −
 1 − ρ ρ 

ξO* =

1
N

(9)

(10)

(11)

Our hypotheses are based on the supply chain model and criteria on which suppliers compete
as described.
HYPOTHESES
Game theoretic models predict that rational player make decisions according to Nash
equilibrium. Our first three main hypotheses are that subjects’ average decisions will be equal to
the corresponding Nash equilibrium for the supplier cost structures (identical or non-identical)
and types of competition that we are studying. Each main hypothesis relates to one of the cost
structures and consists of three sub-hypotheses related to one of the three types of
competitions.
Hypothesis 1 states that suppliers with identical cost structures will make decisions equal to the
Nash equilibrium and has three sub-hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Suppliers with identical cost structures will make decisions equal to the Nash
equilibrium when competing based on guaranteed service levels (inventory fillrates).
Hypothesis 1b: Suppliers with identical cost structures will make decisions equal to the Nash
equilibrium when competing based on guaranteed base stock inventory levels.
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Hypothesis 1c: Suppliers with identical cost structures will make decisions equal to the Nash
equilibrium when competing based on the parameter designed to optimize the
supply chain in favor of the buyer.
Hypothesis 2 states that suppliers will make decisions equal to the Nash equilibrium when they
have heterogeneous cost structures with one supplier having a higher production cost, and it
has three sub-hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Suppliers with heterogeneous production costs will make decisions equal to the
Nash equilibrium when competing based on guaranteed service levels
(inventory fill-rates).
Hypothesis 2b: Suppliers with heterogeneous production costs will make decisions equal to the
Nash equilibrium when competing based on guaranteed base stock inventory
levels.
Hypothesis 2c: Suppliers with heterogeneous production costs will make decisions equal to the
Nash equilibrium when competing based on the parameter designed to
optimize the supply chain in favor of the buyer.
Hypothesis 3 states that suppliers will make decisions equal to the Nash equilibrium when they
have heterogeneous cost structures with one supplier having higher inventory holding costs,
and it has three sub-hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: Suppliers with heterogeneous inventory holding costs will make decisions
equal to the Nash equilibrium when competing based on guaranteed service
levels (inventory fill-rates).
Hypothesis 3b: Suppliers with heterogeneous inventory holding costs will make decisions
equal to the Nash equilibrium when competing based on guaranteed base
stock inventory levels.
Hypothesis 3c: Suppliers with heterogeneous inventory holding costs will make decisions
equal to the Nash equilibrium when competing based on the parameter
designed to optimize the supply chain in favor of the buyer.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To test these hypotheses and investigate how decision makers will perform under different
types of competitions and cost structures, we conducted a series of experiments using nine
different treatments. These consisted of three treatments for each of the service, inventory, and
optimal competitions. For each type of competition, a single treatment was used for suppliers
with identical cost structures, and two treatments were used for heterogeneous costs. The
heterogeneity in cost structure was implemented as either different production costs or different
inventory holding costs.
In all experiments the buyer’s demand was assumed to arrive at a rate of λ and the price of the
product, p, to be 100. The suppliers incurred a capacity cost of k = 5 per unit product per unit
time to adjust their capacity and keep their utilization at ρ = 0.93. When the suppliers had
identical cost structures, their production costs and inventory holding costs were the same, with
c1 = c2 = 20 and h1 = h2 = 1, respectively. For experiments with heterogeneous production costs
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the values c1 = 20 and c2 = 60 were used for production coasts. For heterogeneous inventory
holding costs, the values h1 = 1 and h2 = 2 were incorporated. We deliberately chose a relatively
large difference between the production costs and inventory holding costs so that the extent of
an impact from heterogeneity would be more clearly evident.
Subjects in our experiments assumed the role of competing suppliers with the overall goal of
maximizing profits. Each experiment consisted of 30 independent rounds in which a decision
needed to be made. In order to maximize profits, the subjects needed to consider how the buyer
will allocate demand as well as possible decisions their competitors might make. Under all forms
of competition the decisions subjects made were in the form of base-stock levels. It was
mentioned earlier that there is a one-to-one correspondence between different performance
measures. Therefore, when a subject selects a certain level of base-stock, the values of fill rate
and optimal performance measure are also set. Subjects’ decisions were expressed in the form
of base-stock levels in all forms of competition because it is the only measure that is directly
operational. For instance, a supplier cannot directly set a guaranteed fill rate in practice by
choosing a base-stock level that assures the desired fill rate.
The subjects for all of our experiments were students at a large university located in the
Northeast United States. The instructors of selected courses allowed us to run the experiments
during their class times as a required class activity.
To provide incentive for students to focus on maximizing profits during the experiment, we
presented each experiment as a contest through which the students could find out how good
they were at making decisions under an uncertain competitive environment. In addition, we
offered cash prizes ($40, $30, and $20) to the three students having the highest total profits
after 30 rounds of decision-making. We conducted the experiments in a mix of graduate and
undergraduate classes. Past experimental research in operations management has found that
decisions made by undergraduate and graduate students are not statistically different. See, for
instance, Katok and Wu (2009) and Elahi (2013).
Since the calculation of a supplier’s profit could be complicated, the experiment software
provided an interactive calculation tool. This tool, which was available throughout the
experiments, enabled subjects to enter a prospective decision and see their profits as a function
of the full range of decisions a competitor could make. The appendix shows the user-interface
including the calculation tool.
A strict protocol was followed for conducting all experiments. At the start of each experiment
session, subjects were asked to read a two-page handout describing the supply chain setup and
the decision-making process for the competition. The content of the handout and a short
demonstration of the experiment software was presented orally next. This presentation was
followed by answering any questions that subjects might have.
The next step in our protocol was to let subjects work with the software and, in particular,
examine the calculation tool. After subjects were familiar with the software and had a sense of
how their decisions, in combination with potential decisions by their competitors, would affect
their profits, we had subjects compete in a 5-round practice session. With any remaining
questions answered, we proceeded to start the actual competition. During the first 10 rounds of
competition, the subjects had 75 seconds to make a decision. Pre-testing showed that after 10
rounds subjects had grasped the competition and no longer needed as much time. We therefore
reduced the time limit to 45 seconds for each of the remaining rounds.
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After all subjects had entered a decision or the time limit had expired, a round would end. The
software then paired subjects as competitors randomly (any subject not making a decision was
not paired and assigned a profit of zero). With decisions and competitors assigned, the software
calculated each subject’s share of demand and profit, along with their competitor’s share and
profit. These results, alongside the total profit the subject had accumulated, were displayed on
the screen. At that point, the next round of the competition was begun. See Appendix A for a
sample screenshot of the user interface during a competition.
Before the competitions started for experiments involving treatments with heterogeneous
suppliers, the software randomly divided subjects into one of two sets. One set was assigned a
higher cost than the other for either c or h, depending on the particular experiment. We then
apprised all subjects of which set they were assigned to and that those with higher costs could
expect lower profits than their competitors. Subjects were also made aware that, at the end of
experiments, we would normalize all subjects’ profits with respect to their costs; hence,
everyone had a fair chance of winning the prize money.
RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 show the results of our experiments as well as the corresponding theoretical
Nash equilibrium for identical and heterogeneous suppliers, respectively. To analyze the results
of our experiments we use Wilcoxon rank sum test (Levine et al. 2011, pp. 447-451). The unit of
our analysis is the average base-stock decision made by each subject, and the column of pvalues in each table show where the differences between our results and the Nash equilibrium
are statistically significant.
As shown in Table 1, there are significant differences between suppliers’ decisions and the
Nash equilibrium for all cases in which suppliers have identical cost structures.
Note that we consider each of the subjects in our experiments as a single sample, and that for
our statistical analysis we are using the average of 30 decisions made by each subject, rather
than the values of the individual decisions made by each subject for each of 30 rounds. In other
words, the analysis shown in Table 1 is based on data from decisions made by a total of 47
subjects over 30 rounds of decision-making.
Table 1: Subjects’ average decisions vs. Nash equilibrium (Suppliers with identical costs)
Base-stock Level
p-value
Experimental
Competition Type Sample Size Nash Equilibrium
Results
(two tail)
Service
13
19
24
<0.01
Inventory
12
34
54
<0.01
Optimal
22
77
68
<0.01
Based on these results we reject Hypothesis 1 and each of its three sub-hypotheses, finding
that suppliers with identical cost structures will make decisions significantly different from the
Nash equilibrium for all three types of competition.
This finding does not always hold for competing suppliers with heterogeneous cost structures,
and Table 2 displays the results with a set of columns for each of the two suppliers designated
as Supplier 1 and Supplier 2. Note that Supplier 1 is the lower cost supplier and Supplier 2 the
supplier with higher costs.
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Table 2: Subjects’ average decisions vs. Nash equilibrium (Suppliers with heterogeneous costs)
Supplier 1 Base-Stock Level
Supplier 2 Base-Stock Level
p-value
p-value
Competition Sample
Experimental
Experimental
Type
Size
Nash
Results
(two tailed) Nash
Results
(two tailed)
Heterogeneous Suppliers with different production costs (c1=20, c2=60)
Service
18
19
19
>0.05
13
15
>0.05
Inventory
24
32
41
0.02
18
26
0.04
Optimal
28
77
51
<0.01
42
43
>0.05
Heterogeneous Suppliers with different inventory holding costs (h1=1, h2=2)
Service
17
19
21
>0.05
14
19
<0.01
Inventory
25
33
36
0.04
19
34
<0.01
Optimal
27
77
58
<0.01
44
51
0.01
This table shows results vary by the type of competition. In particular, three of the four cases of
service competition shown no significant differences between suppliers’ decisions and the Nash
equilibrium. With no significant differences for suppliers with heterogeneous production costs,
and for one of the two with heterogeneous inventory holding costs, we accept Hypotheses 2a
and 3a.
For inventory competitions there are significant differences between subjects’ decisions and the
Nash equilibrium for all cases. This is true whether a supplier has the higher or the lower costs,
and whether the difference was in production costs or inventory holding costs. We therefore
reject Hypotheses 2b and 3b and conclude the decisions do not match the Nash equilibrium.
For optimal competitions there are significant differences for cases in which suppliers have
heterogeneous inventory holding costs, but only one of the two cases, which is for the more
efficient low cost supplier. We therefore can reject Hypothesis 3c. Although the results for the
higher-cost supplier did differ significantly from the Nash equilibrium, we can also reject
Hypothesis 3b based on the results for the more efficient low-cost supplier. These are
somewhat mixed results and a topics explored in the discussion section.
We see that the subjects’ average decisions are smaller than the corresponding Nash
equilibrium when the suppliers have identical cost structures. We can observe the same
behavior for the subjects who play the role of more efficient supplier (Supplier 1), when the
suppliers are not identical. The subjects who played the role of less efficient supplier (Supplier
2), however, do not follow this pattern. Under the optimal competition, all the differences are
significant except for the less efficient supplier when the production costs are different.
Therefore, we can reject Hypotheses 3a and 3c.
DISCUSSION
The results of our experiments suggest that the assumption of perfectly rational decisionmakers, an assumption on which the Nash equilibrium is based, does not necessarily hold for
the outsourcing competitions studied in this research. Behavioral factors can influence decisionmaking and offer an explanation of why subjects did not reach the highest level of potential
profits. While other factors could also be in play, we examine how loss aversion can be a
behavioral influence and explanation why competing suppliers did not maximize profits as
theory suggests.
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Loss Aversion
Our results show that in competitions based on both service and inventory criteria, subjects
playing the role of suppliers with identical costs will always reach stability with decisions
significantly different that the Nash equilibrium points. However, when engaged in an optimal
competition we do not see this pattern. Subjects’ average decisions, under optimal competition,
are smaller than the corresponding Nash equilibrium, except for the less efficient supplier in the
cases where the suppliers have heterogeneous costs.
To gain insight into this behavior we first look at a supplier’s profit function with respect to the
potential decisions that could made by competitors. This is because the share of demand
allocated to a supplier depends on the decisions made by both the supplier and the supplier’s
competitors. More specifically, we look at a supplier’s profit when their competitor chooses
either the Nash equilibrium as their decision as well as chooses the average decision observed
in our experiments. Figures 1 to 3 show these profit functions. The curves in these figures with
the solid lines show a supplier’s expected profit for different decisions given that the
competitor’s decision is at the Nash equilibrium value. The curves with a dashed line represent
the supplier’s expected profit when a competitor’s decision is the average of the decisions we
observed in our experiments.
From these figures it can be seen that the rate of change in a supplier’s profit near its maximum
point is much steeper for a service competition than either for an inventory or optimal
competition. In other words, any deviation from the optimal decision is more costly for suppliers
in a service competition in any other type. This observation might explain the gap between
subjects’ decisions and the corresponding Nash equilibrium points in service competitions and
why it is (almost always) smaller than the difference observed in either inventory or optimal
competitions.
The figures also show that in service competitions with heterogeneous suppliers with different
production costs, subjects manage to (statistically) capture the Nash equilibrium. This is also the
case for the more efficient supplier in service competitions where suppliers have different
inventory holding costs. This can mean that, although an optimal competition can produce the
best results for the buyer, it is difficult for subjects to capture the best decisions in an optimal
competition due to the relatively flat profit functions around the decision which maximizes profit.
The opposite is true for the service competition, in which the buyer receives a lower service
level because subjects are able to reach the point where profits maximized.
The figures also show that if a supplier’s competitor chooses the Nash equilibrium as their
decision in an optimal competition (indicated by z2 = 77 in the rightmost chart of Figure 1), then
any deviation the supplier makes other than matching the competitor’s decision will produce a
negative profit. This means that subjects’ loss aversion can play an important role when
engaged in this type of competition. When the suppliers have identical costs in an optimal
competition, the only way suppliers can earn a positive profit is when both suppliers’ decisions
are lower than the Nash equilibrium. Although this is not an equilibrium condition, any
movement away from it can result in a negative profit, and this is exactly subjects’ behavior in
our experiments. Instead of attempting to make decisions that would yield the maximum profits,
they appear to have made decisions that would avoid receiving profits that were negative.
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Figure 1: Profit functions for suppliers with identical cost structures
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Figure 2: Profit functions for suppliers with heterogeneous costs – different capacity costs (c)
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Figure 3: Profit functions for suppliers with heterogeneous costs - different holding costs (h)
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CONCLUSIONS
This research contributes by examining theoretical results applied to a model of outsourcing
derived from prior work, and evaluates the theories in an experimental study. For this we
conducted experiments with three types of competition between suppliers: service, inventory,
and optimal. In each type of competition suppliers would compete for a single buyer’s demand
allocated based on a measure of performance (competition criteria) defined and announced by
the buyer prior to the start of competitions.
Our experimental results show that the actual decisions competing suppliers make do not
always match the decisions predicted by the Nash equilibrium. They show that the actual
decisions are closest to the Nash equilibrium value in service competitions; in competitions
based on the inventory and optimal criteria the differences are more pronounced. In most cases
there are statistically significant differences between the actual decisions and theoretical
predictions.
The deviation of subjects’ decisions from the Nash equilibrium indicates that subjects do not
always behave purely in a rational way as the Nash equilibrium assumes. A rational decision
maker always aims to find the decision that will maximize expected profit. When decisions
deviate from the Nash equilibrium value there might be behavioral influences that induce
decisions that do not maximize profit. We therefore investigated reasons why subjects did not,
or could not, maximize profits (i.e. reach the Nash equilibrium). In part, these deviations from
theory can be accounted for by loss aversion behavior.
Our supply chain model has important similarities to supply chains in the real world. Showing
that the decisions that competing suppliers make do not always maximize profits, as theory
predicts, is one important result from our study. Evaluating a behavioral influence as a potential
explanation for this behavior is another important contribution. The findings from our study can
be useful for buyers to determine the best means by which to award contracts, and for suppliers
who need to understand potential influences that can lead decisions away from maximizing
profits.
Existing theory as it relates to the supply chain model we study has not yet been validated
experimentally. Within the context of this model we compare actual decisions with theory by
using experiments that involved different forms of competition and varying cost and industry
structures. Further research could investigate additional scenarios and further generalize the
findings from our study. In particular, for this study we could only conduct a limited number of
experiments and therefore use a relatively small set of parameters for suppliers’ cost structures.
We explored scenarios involving only two suppliers, and our model is based on specific
assumptions, such how demand is generated. Relaxing these assumptions, analyzing the
sensitivity of our results to the parameters we used, and expanding the range of scenarios could
all be fruitful topics for further research.
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APPENDIX A
This screen shot is from the software we developed for this research and is of the screen
subjects used while experiments were being conducted. The results from each round are shown
on the left of the screen as the competition progresses, and the calculation tool used to analyze
pro-forma profits based on potential decisions by a supplier and a competitor is displayed on the
right hand side of the screen:

